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Abstract 
 If institutions are essential for long-run performance, why don’t developing countries adopt 
institutions in developed countries to become rich? In this dynamic model, culture affects a ruler’s 
institutional choice, while culture itself evolves endogenously. Multiple stable steady states are 
possible, and even similar initial conditions can lead to dramatically different steady states. The 
state of Qin’s unification of China in 221 BC is used to illustrate the model. In one steady state, 
consistent with what happened in the state of Qin, individuals value material incentives. Qin did 
not strictly practice the patriarchal clan system advocated by Confucianism. Qin adopted Legalist 
institutions under which government officials were chosen by merit, and Qin culture was further 
shaped by Legalism. In another steady state, consistent with what happened in states other than 
Qin, individuals value loyalty and family values. Those states chose not to adopt Legalist 
institutions comprehensively for fearing that inconsistencies between culture and institutions could 
lead to internal rebellions even though institutional reforms would increase their military power. 
Other cases of how the interdependence between culture and institutions affects performance are 
also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars have debated the relative importance of geography, culture, and institutions in 
affecting a country’s long-run performance (North, 1990; Diamond, 1997; Iannaccone, 1998; 
Zhou, 2011a).1 Many economists believe that institutions are essential. Then one question is the 
following: why don’t developing countries adopt institutions in developed countries to become 
rich?2 To shed light on this question, we can gather hints from historical events in ancient China. 
Hundreds of political units competed in the Spring and Autumn period (770 BC- 476 BC) 
and the Warring States period (476 BC -221 BC) of China. Regional populations were growing 
(Zhou, 2009), and vassals extended their authority beyond their original fief centered on a town, 
 
1 Diamond (1997) has argued that geographical conditions can affect possibilities of the domestication of large 
animals, the kind of contagious diseases, the development of agriculture, thus a region’s long-run performance. Gallup, 
Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) have tested how geographical conditions affect the spread of diseases and economic 
development. Iannaccone (1998) illustrates the impact of religion (an aspect of culture) on economic performance. 
Zhou (2011a) compares growth rates for a market economy and a planned economy. 
2 A country’s sustained growth depends on technical progress and China’s strong state capacity helps developing 
technological capabilities in the last four decades (Zhou, 2018b). 
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bringing the countryside into the fold. That is, providing citizenship or land rights to peasants in 
the countryside in exchange for taxes and military services (Hui, 2005). During this process, 
stronger states frequently annexed weaker ones. Near the end of the Warring States period, there 
were still seven major states competing with one another. In 221 BC, the state of Qin completed 
conquering others and unified China. This is the first time that China became unified and is a 
historical event with great significance.3 Why was the state of Qin the eventual winner in the 
competition to unify China?   
Confucianism and Legalism were the two prominent philosophies at that time. As 
illustrated in Zhou (2011b), Confucianism emphasizes family value and views the country as an 
extended family. This school believes that human nature is good. While material incentives are 
despised, loyalty and filial piety are viewed as important virtues. Confucianism idealizes tradition 
and is associated with the system of enfeoffment under which nobles controlled politics. This 
school does not value the buildup of military capacities because Confucianism believes that moral 
persuasion is a better tool than military strength in handling international affairs. Legalism gets its 
name because this school argues that law should be applied equally to all citizens rather than 
treating nobles and commoners differently. The main purpose of Legalism is to help the ruler to 
win wars. Under Legalism, individuals are encouraged to be loyal to the ruler rather than to 
families or clans. This school assumes that persons are selfish (rational). Instead of seeking 
officials with high morale, this school emphasizes institution-building.4 Legalism endeavors to 
solve real-world problems, does not try to find inspirations from the past, and is associated with 
the commandery-county system under which merits rather than blood are the criterion to select 
government officials. It is generally agreed that Legalist institutions introduced through the 
Reforms of Shang Yang played the most significant role in determining Qin’s unification of China 
(Li, 1977, p. xiii; An, 2014, p. 6).5  
The Qin dynasty did not last very long. Shang Yang and Legalism have received quite 
divergent assessments in China’s history (Li, 1977, Introduction). In the following Han dynasty, 
 
3 The unification of China affected China’s institutions and culture fundamentally (Zhou, 2018a). After unification, 
Qin Shihuang established a common language, measure, currency, and behavioral mode in China more than two 
thousand years ago. 
4 Han Fei argues that institutions should be designed in such a way that they can be operated even by a ruler with 
average abilities. That is, performance of institutions should not rely on superb abilities of a ruler. 
5 For example, Jia Yi in the Han dynasty has argued that the rise and fall of Qin was a result of the practice of Legalist 
institutions (Li, 1977, p. xxvii).  
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Emperor Liu Che adopted Confucianism as the national philosophy. This adoption does not mean 
Legalism became irrelevant in China’s history. Emperor Liu Che engaged in large-scale military 
campaigns, inconsistent with Confucianism. Actually, the national strategy of governance at that 
time can be viewed as Confucianism appearance with Legalism essence (Zhou, 2011b; An, 2014, 
p. 2; Zhao, 2015): Confucianism was used to cover the cold-blood image of Legalism. 6 The 
following dialogue between Emperor Liu Xun and his crown prince Liu Shi in the Han dynasty 
illustrates this point. Liu Shi suggested to his father to rely more on Confucianism and less on 
punishments to rule. Liu Xun was angry and scorned his son by stating that the rule of Han dynasty 
relies on a combination of forces and benevolence. Liu Xun was upset that his son’s strong belief 
in Confucianism might lead to a decline of the rule by the royal family (Ban, 1997). It is generally 
agreed that institutions of all following Chinese dynasties were built on Qin institutions (Li, 1977, 
p. lxi; An, 2014, p. 13). For example, Han dynasty adopted almost all Qin institutions intact (An, 
2014, p. 57). 
Even though we agree that the adoption of Legalist institutions was crucial for Qin’s 
unification of China, there are still some important questions to be addressed. First, if institutions 
were so vital for a state’s fate, why didn’t other states such as Wei (魏) reform to adopt Qin’s 
institutions more suitable for survival?7 One reasonable answer to this question is that a state’s 
culture affects its choice of institutions. Since cultures in other states were different from that in 
Qin, adoption of Qin’s institutions could lead to internal rebellions, and rulers in other states thus 
chose not to do so. Second, however, culture itself is not exogenously given and is evolving over 
time. Why didn’t culture in other states evolve in such a way to make the adoption of Qin’s 
institutions more likely? Overall, a dynamic model with culture and institutions endogenously 
determined is needed to understand long-run performance of states. 
In this paper, we use a model on the interdependence between culture and institutions to 
explain issues such as Qin’s unification of China. In this model, to handle internal rebellions and 
 
6 Legalists argue that punishment should be severe so that violations of law will be deterred. Many people view 
Legalists as being cold-blooded. Han Fei, a brilliant scholar and the synthesizer of Legalist ideas, illustrates the ideas 
of Legalism clearly. To win wars, scarce resources should not be wasted. Thus, the ruler should reward desired 
behavior and punish undesirable behavior. Han Fei applies the above principle to synthesize Legalist ideas. As a great 
scholar, he avoids internal contradiction of his theory. However, this principle implies that poor and starving people 
should not be helped by the government because merits rather than poverty should be rewarded. 
7 Wei could mean either 魏 or 卫 in Chinese, and both 魏 and 卫 were names of states in the Spring Autumn and 
Warring States periods. Chinese characters will be added when there may be confusion about the meaning of words. 
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external threats, a ruler chooses between two types of institutions to adopt: Confucianism and 
Legalism. The adoption of Legalist institutions means inherited positions will be eliminated and 
government officials are appointed by merit. On the one hand, culture affects the ruler’s choice of 
institutions because an increase in the level of inconsistency between culture and institutions will 
increase the possibility of internal rebellions. On the other hand, culture evolves endogenously in 
this model and its evolution is determined by direct socialization with parents and indirect 
socialization with social environment (Bisin and Verdier, 2001).  
We show that multiple steady states may exist. In one steady state, a high percentage of the 
population values material incentives and the ruler adopts Legalist institutions. This steady state 
is consistent with what happened in the state of Qin, which did not strictly practice the patriarchal 
clan system advocated by Confucianism and where officials were appointed by merits. In another 
steady state, a low percentage of the population values material incentives and the ruler adopts 
mainly Confucian institutions. The second type of steady state is consistent with what happened 
in the other six states. The practice of patriarchal clan system in those states led to powerful elites 
and nobles’ monopoly of government positions. Adoption of Legalist institutions would imply 
elimination of inherited positions for nobles and would lead to internal rebellions. Thus, rulers in 
those states chose not to adopt Legalist institutions as comprehensively as Qin.  
While the state of Qin succeeded in unifying China, we are not arguing that Qin’s culture 
was superior to cultures in other states. Military strength and cultural sophistication are two 
different things. In China’s history, King Wu of Zhou succeeded in overthrowing the rule of Shang. 
However, it is believed that culture in Zhou lagged that of Shang (Creel, 1970). 
In this paper, we refer to institutions only as formal rules in order to differentiate 
institutions from culture and norms (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). The literature on culture, 
institutions, and economic performance is growing quickly, as illustrated in Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2006) and Alesina and Giuliano (2015). One issue that scholars have studied intensively 
is how generalized trust affects economic performance (Francois and Zabojnik, 2005; Tabellini, 
2010; Gorodnichendo and Roland, 2017). This paper is directly related to models studying the 
interaction between culture and institutions, such as Tabellini (2008) and Binder and Francois 
(2011). Tabellini (2008) has addressed the interaction between values and formal enforcement. In 
his model, distance between individuals affects the benefit of cooperation. Strategic 
complementarities in terms of the parents’ education of children into cooperative type exist. When 
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institutions are chosen through majority voting, he shows that an economy may be trapped in a 
state with inefficient institutions. Binder and Francois (2011) have examined the interaction 
between trust and institutions. In their model, individuals may be rational, honest, or dishonest. A 
rational individual will cheat if it is beneficial to do so and the quality of institutions determines 
the probability that cheating is detected. The focus of their model is significantly different from 
that of this paper. To motivate their empirical research, they are mainly interested in how country 
size affects the choice of institutions. To understand whether rulers in states other than Qin were 
rational because they did not adopt Legalist institutions as comprehensively as Qin, we are mainly 
interested in whether multiple stable steady states exist. In their theoretical model, Bisin and 
Verdier (2017) have established conditions such that culture and institutions complement each 
other. This paper contributes to the literature on the interdependence between culture and 
institutions by focusing on a novel dimension-the basis upon which individuals are appointed to 
government positions (merit versus inheritance) and individuals’ attitudes toward this. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and compares major institutional 
reforms in the Warring States periods. To motivate the model, cultural differences between the 
state of Qin and other states are illustrated to explain why other states did not follow the Reforms 
of Shang Yang in reforming their institutions. Section 3 sets up the model and studies the existence 
of multiple stable steady states. Section 4 uses the period of Northern and Southern dynasties (386 
- 589) in ancient China and the fall of King Pahlavi in Iran to illustrate how the interdependence 
between culture and institutions affects long-run performance. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Culture, institutions, and Qin’s unification of China  
 In this section, we discuss major institutional reforms in the Warring States periods and the 
role of culture and institutions in Qin’s unification of China. 
  
2.1. Major institution reforms in the Warring States period 
 During the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, the adoption of iron in 
agriculture led to large increases in productivities and population (Yang, 1955). A larger 
population increased the demand for land and led to inter-state wars. To avoid annexation, states 
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engaged in reforms to increase military power (Hui, 2005, pp. 178-190).8 For example, with the 
new emphasis on infantry rather than chariots in fighting, military service was extended to 
peasants. This undercut the power and privileges of the aristocracy and led to their oppositions. 
For instance, when Zichan reformed in the state of Zheng, inhabitants of the capital town opposed 
the extension of military levy into the countryside. In this subsection, we briefly illustrate and 
compare major institutional reforms in the Warring States period.  
 First, Marquis Wen (472 BC -396 BC), the first ruler of the state of Wei (魏), conducted 
reforms in Wei. Wei’s location did not benefit its defense because enemies could come from all 
directions. Faced with significant external threats, Marquis Wen tried to reform. Li Kui, a 
pioneering Legalist, became a high-ranking official. He eliminated prerogatives of nobles and used 
incentives to elicit desired behaviors. With the reforms, the state of Wei was the first superpower 
in the Warring States period and maintained its position for more than one hundred years, until it 
was defeated by the state of Qi during the Battle of Maling in 342 BC.   
Second, Wu Qi, a professional trying everything (such as killing his wife to win trust) to 
get opportunities to use his skills and to establish his fame, reformed in the state of Chu.9 Wu Qi 
initially provided his service in the state of Wei under Marquis Wen. Envied by a member of the 
noble family (Gong Shu Zuo), Wu Qi escaped from the state of Wei during the rule of Marquis 
Wu to the state of Chu (Sima, 1988, pp. 523-525). From 386 BC to 381 BC, King Dao of Chu 
employed Wu Qi as prime minister to reform. To concentrate scarce resources on military 
purposes, Wu Qi reduced the stipends of nobles and eliminated redundant government positions. 
Since their interests were harmed, nobles killed Wu Qi after King Dao died from a disease. To 
appease the nobles, the new king reversed some reform measures. With reform aborted, noble 
families again controlled important government positions in Chu.   
 
8 Guan Zhong (approximately 720 BC- 645 BC) conducted an early institutional reform in the state of Qi under Duke 
Huan. To increase state’s direct control of citizens, Guan Zhong placed citizens into an organizational framework not 
necessarily associated with clans. He also took measures such as producing salt from sea and opening mines to produce 
metals to make Qi richer. With the reforms, the state of Qi became a hegemony (Sima, 1988, pp. 257-259). Compared 
with the Reforms of Shang Yang about three centuries later, the reforms in Qi did not focus on increasing military 
power. Actually, Guan Zhong tried to use moral rather than military power to help Duke Huan to win hegemony. 
9 As pointed out by a referee, the central government’s ability to control the country was helped by the lack of a 
consistent powerful challenge to the central government in the Chu territories. Relative to some states, there were few 
powerful aristocratic families with fiefs in Chu. The kinship system and hereditary traditions were relatively weak in 
Chu and the Chu king took lands away from aristocrats and moved them around with some ease (Creel, 1964).  
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Third and finally, Shang Yang conducted his milestone reforms in the state of Qin. Before 
the Reforms of Shang Yang, Qin lost large tracts of territory along the west bank of the Yellow 
River to the state of Wei (Hui, 2005, p. 65). This loss opened Qin to further invasions and increased 
Qin’s incentives to reform. Under Duke Xiao who ruled from 361 BC to 338 BC, Shang Yang, an 
important Legalist, introduced historical reforms in the state of Qin (Lin, 1981a, p. 175). The 
Reforms lasted for about twenty years. Compared with the above reforms, Reforms of Shang Yang 
in Qin came later, but were much more comprehensive and successful (Hui, 2005, chap. 2).  
Duke Xian of Qin (father of Duke Xiao) took various measures to reform, which laid the 
foundations of the Reforms of Shang Yang. Duke Xian was a refugee living in the state of Wei for 
almost thirty years and was well informed of Wei’s reform. Under Duke Xian, first, Qin moved its 
capital from Yongcheng to Yueyang. At the new capital, the influence of nobles who might oppose 
reforms was smaller. Second, Duke Xian introduced the tax system in which the amount of land 
determined the amount of tax, regardless of whether land was privately or public owned. Third, 
Duke Xian established counties in some regions near Qin borders. Since Qin did not have counties 
previously, this was an organizational reform. This reform prepared the further adoption of 
counties throughout the state of Qin by Shang Yang.  
Shang Yang also lived in the state of Wei before moving to Qin to pursue his fortune, and 
he was also well informed of the reforms in the state of Wei. During the Reforms, Qin moved its 
capital further from Yueyang to Xianyang (Lin, 1981a, p. 189). In addition to unifying measure, 
Shang Yang implemented various policies. First, individuals could keep privately claimed land. 
Incentives such as providing tax benefits were provided to attract immigrants from other states to 
engage in agricultural production, so that Qin natives could specialize on military campaigns. 
Second, Legalism was adopted as the national philosophy which emphasized institution-building 
and the usage of incentives in eliciting behavior desired by the state. Shang Yang eliminated 
inherited positions for nobles and individuals needed military achievements to get promotions. 
Third, before the Reforms, some regions were organized as counties while other regions were ruled 
by Great Officers. During the Reforms, Shang Yang organized those regions into counties (Lin, 
1981a, p. 188). Since county officials were appointed by the ruler of Qin while Great Officers were 
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inherited positions, the adoption of the county system throughout the whole state reduced the 
power of nobles and increased the ruler’s direct control of resources.10  
With interests harmed, nobles opposed Shang Yang’s reforms. Even the crown prince 
violated the law, and his two teachers were punished by Shang Yang (Sima, 1988, pp. 545-549). 
After Duke Xiao’s death, the crown prince became the new ruler: King Hui of Qin. After a failed 
escape, Shang Yang was captured and killed by King Hui, but King Hui kept the reform measures. 
After Qin unified China, Qin institutions spread to other parts of China. While the Qin dynasty did 
not last long, later dynasties either adopted Qin’s institutions or their institutions were built on 
Qin’s institutions (An, 2014, p. 13). In this sense, Shang Yang is frequently viewed as the chief 
architect of the Chinese state (Li, 1977, p. xiv).  
Before the Reforms of Shang Yang, without the practice of patriarchal clan system in Qin, 
even slaves in other states could become high-ranking officials in Qin. One example is Baili Xi, 
who was a slave in the state of Jin, served as a prime minister in Qin (Sima, 1988, p. 41). After the 
Reforms of Shang Yang, Qin further opened its door and attracted talented individuals from other 
states. Many high-ranking officials in Qin such as Fan Ju and Li Si came from other states. Those 
talented foreigners helped Qin to develop first-class strategies.11 A frequent problem faced by the 
states was that talented persons serving the same ruler could be envy of each other. Even though 
high-ranking officials in Qin might also sabotage one another, Shang Yang eliminated inherited 
positions and further opened many slots for ambitious individuals trying to improve their fortunes, 
and Qin could keep on attracting talents from other states.  
While inter-state wars and coalition strategies among states had important direct effects 
(Hui, 2005, chap. 2), institutions introduced through the Reforms laid the foundations for Qin to 
unify China. With the introduction of iron in producing weapons, wars became large-scale at that 
 
10 Creel (1964) argues that Chu was the first state to adopt counties. Chu’s relatively stronger central authority (i.e. 
the relatively weaker lineage families throughout the country) might have contributed to this early appearance of a 
county system. Before the adoption of the county system, the power of Great officers was high. There are numerous 
cases that power struggle between the ruler and Great Officers led to regime changes in the Warring States period. 
For example, in the state of Qi, a Great Officer usurped the power even though the name of the state was kept. In the 
county system, local officials were rotated every few years and might not be allowed to serve in their hometown area 
(Edwards, 2009). 
11 For example, Fan Ju suggested the strategy of befriending states far away from Qin while attacking those nearby, 
thus avoiding useless occupation of territories not adjacent to the state of Qin (Lin, 1981a, p. 260). Li Si established 
the order of conquering other states by pointing out that the state of Han (韩) should be conquered first. Han was next 
to Qin and was the weakest among the other six states. The conquest of Han made it easier for Qin to attack other 
states. 
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time. In the Warring States period, the seven major states had soldiers ranging from 300,000 to 
one million (Yang, 1955). Without a strong economy, it would be impossible to maintain a large 
standing army. To win wars, soldiers need to be supplied with food. Thus, it is essential to increase 
food production and to ensure that the produced food is not wasted. After the Reforms, with more 
land and people, agricultural production in Qin increased, and the government directed agricultural 
output effectively to military purposes. The impact of the Reforms of Shang Yang can be seen 
from the evolution of the size of the region ruled by Qin. In year 350 BC, the region ruled by Qin 
during the Reforms was smaller than that ruled by the state of Chu (Tan, 1982, pp. 33-34). After 
the Reforms, the region ruled by Qin increased over time and began to be larger than that ruled by 
Chu. Eventually, Qin annexed all other states.12 
 
2.2. Why was the state of Qin the eventual winner to unify China? 
Geography, culture, and institutions played important roles in affecting states’ fates during 
the Warring States period. A combination of these factors provides a satisfactory explanation of 
why the state of Qin was the eventual unifier of China. First, in terms of geography, Qin was 
located in an easily defensible area in western China. After Qin conquered nomadic groups on its 
west, enemies mainly came from the east side. Qin’s topological conditions made the state easy to 
defend and hard to conquer (Lin, 1981a, p. 237). This advantage is clear when compared with the 
state of Han (韩). Han was surrounded by other powers from all sides and frequently got attacked. 
However, geographical conditions alone could not provide a satisfactory answer in explaining 
Qin’s success: while geographical conditions were relatively fixed, which state was strongest 
changed hands several times in the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods. Qin’s 
dominance over other states was firmly established only after the Reforms of Shang Yang (An, 
2014, p. 13). In addition, states such as Chu (located in the southern part of China) and Yan (located 
in the northern part of China) might also have enjoyed geographical advantages. Geographical 
conditions may also affect performance through affecting culture and institutions. However, for 
simplicity we do not study the impact of geography in this model. Second, Qin’s culture was 
different from other six states’. During prolonged periods of wars with nomadic groups, Qin 
 
12 Qin’s unification of China lasted for less than twenty years. The Qin state was established to support fighting wars. 
While laws and rules were strict and harsh, rewards from performing well in battle were also high. After Qin unified 
China, there was no more large pieces of fertile land to take over and the people lived under a harsh state without the 
previous benefits. This led to the collapse of the Qin when peasants rebelled (Hui, 2005). 
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developed a culture that emphasized performance rather than ideology (Ran, 1957). Influence of 
Confucianism such as the practice of primogeniture was less in Qin than that in other states. Lack 
of practice of primogeniture reduced the power of nobles and made the Reforms of Shang Yang 
possible and successful. Third, for the role of institutions, as discussed previously, the Reforms of 
Shang Yang laid the foundation for Qin to unify China.   
While Qin could imitate Wei in reforming institutions, why didn’t other states follow Qin 
in reforming their institutions? For example, the state of Wei might have introduced another round 
of reforms by imitating Qin’s practice. In terms of the amount of time needed to respond, reforms 
by other states were possible because more than one hundred years passed between the Reforms 
of Shang Yang and Qin’s unification of China. For a period lasting more than one hundred years, 
other states obviously recognized threats from Qin. There are some examples that institutional 
adoptions were feasible during this period. First, after the Reforms of Shang Yang, the state of 
Zhao engaged in a reform to adopt habits of nomadic groups in fighting wars. Second, in the state 
of Yan, King Zhao engaged in reforms, attracted capable foreigners such as Le Yi, and succeeded 
in defeating the state of Qi (Sima, 1988, pp. 632-633). While all other six states during the Warring 
States period engaged in some reforms (otherwise they might have already been annexed much 
earlier), none of them adopted institutional reforms as comprehensively as Qin did. 
Difference in culture was a key factor that can be used to explain why other states did not 
introduce reforms as comprehensively as the Reforms of Shang Yang. Initially Qin ancestors 
raised horses for the Zhou ruling house (Sima, 1988, p. 41), and the development of Qin culture 
lagged that of other states (Lin, 1981a, p. 26; An, 2014, p. 7). In fact, none of the first-class scholars 
at that time (such as Han Fei) was a native of Qin (Lin, 1987). Language and religion are important 
aspects of culture and language and religion in Qin were different from other states (Lin, 1987; 
Liu, 1990; He, 1999). Languages in Qin and other six states originated from language in the Zhou 
dynasty. While there were regional variations of languages in the other six states, they still 
belonged to the same system. However, the Qin language was a separate system. Compared with 
the other six states, development of religion in Qin was at a lower level, focusing more on deities 
related to daily lives. Consistent with Confucianism, religions in the other six states focused more 
on deities related to ancestries (He, 1999).   
Patriarchal clan system is the most important aspect of Confucianism (Lin, 1987). Under 
this system, the eldest son of the legal wife of the king inherited the country and other sons of the 
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king became Great Officers. Similarly, the eldest son of the legal wife of a Great Officer became 
a Great Officer and other sons became shi (士). Under this system, employing individuals of low 
origins as officials could lead to rebellions and the death of the ruler because only the nobles had 
the right to rule. The practice of the patriarchal clan system in the six states means that high ranking 
positions were monopolized by nobles and the placement of foreigners into high-ranking positions 
was very limited in those states. For example, in the state of Chu, three noble families (Zhao, Qu, 
and Jing) controlled high-rank positions. All three families were relatives of Chu kings. In the state 
of Qi, it was also difficult for foreigners to obtain high-ranking positions. The practice of the 
patriarchal clan system led to powerful nobles because this system led to the existence of Great 
Officers with their own military forces and inheritable territories. The practice of the patriarchal 
clan system explains why reforms in other states such as Chu were not so successful. Inherited 
nobles in Chu were powerful enough to rebel when the introduction of Legalist institutions reduced 
or eliminated inherited positions. In general, culture in the other six states prevented them from 
adopting reforms as comprehensive as Qin did. For example, Confucianism had huge influence in 
the state of Qi. Adoption of Legalist institutions in a comprehensive way would increase 
possibilities of internal rebellions. Thus, rulers in other states chose not to do so.   
A distinct feature of Qin culture is that the patriarchal clan system was not strictly enforced 
(Ran, 1957; Lin, 1981a, p. 80, p. 85). 13  For this reason, other states referred Qin people as 
barbarians (Ran, 1957) and Qin was not invited to important meetings among vassals before the 
Reforms of Shang Yang (Lin, 1981a, p. 176). The decisive factor in selecting the next king in Qin 
was that the candidate should be brave and strong, and the eldest son of the legal wife might not 
be favored. For example, for the nine kings from Duke Xiang to Duke Mu, only two of them were 
the eldest sons. After Duke Mu, Qin still did not practice primogeniture in selecting kings (Lin, 
1987). Qin’s conflicts with other states during the Warring States period were both military and 
cultural (Liu, 1990; He, 1999). The other six states regarded Qin as different from them: Qin was 
viewed as a state of “tigers and wolves”, cruel and not to be trusted (Sima, 1988, p. 556).14 The 
other six states did not use this nomenclature to refer to one another (He, 1999).  
 
13 Lin (1981b, p. 18) states that the most important feature of the political system of Qin is that Qin did not practice 
the patriarchal clan system (“秦国的政治制度最大的特点，就是没有实行分封制”), see also Lin (1981a, p. 80). 
14 The behavior of Shang Yang illustrates the cold-blooded image of Legalists well. When he lived in Wei, he was 
well treated by Prince Ang of Wei. After Shang Yang moved to Qin, he led an army of Qin fighting with one led by 
Prince Ang. Shang Yang exploited the trust of Prince Ang to kidnap him and defeated the Wei army (Sima, 1988, p. 
547). Later, Shang Yang paid for his cheating: when wanted by King Hui of Qin, Shang Yang ran away to Wei. Wei 
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The fate of the state of Jin can also be used to illustrate the impact of culture on long-run 
performance. Since Duke Wu of Jin came from the family of a younger son rather than the oldest 
son of a king (Sima, 1988, p. 313), the state of Jin then sent princes out of the state to prevent 
younger princes usurping power from happening again. Like Qin, Jin also rewarded military 
performance and this led to the rise of powerful clans such as Wei, Zhao, and Han not closely 
related to the royal family. Jin’s culture allowed the land of those clans to be inherited. Over time, 
Wei, Zhao, and Han became too powerful and divided land of Jin and the state of Jin disappeared 
(Sima, 1988, p. 334). 
Even though Legalism originated outside Qin, with its match with Qin’s culture, ideas of 
this school were widely adopted only in Qin. While culture affected a ruler’s choice of institutions, 
institutions also affected the evolution of culture. Institutions introduced through the Reforms of 
Shang Yang made the culture of Qin further different from those in other states. The Reforms 
made residents even more interested in material interests. Residents in Qin were characterized as 
intolerant, narrow-minded, and more interested in short run gains, while residents in Qi and Lu 
(hometown of Confucius) were characterized as tolerant and slow (He, 1999). After Qin unified 
China, Qin culture was promoted throughout China. Cultural conflicts between Legalism and 
Confucianism eventually led Qin Shihuang to burn non-Legalist literature and to bury Confucian 
scholars alive (Lin, 1990). 
To summarize, Qin’s culture affected Qin’s institutional choice because lack of the 
patriarchal clan system made it less likely for nobles to accumulate power over generations and 
thus Qin could choose officials by merit,15 while Qin’s institutional choice again affected Qin’s 
culture. Similar initial conditions can lead to dramatically different long-run performance. The 
following model will try to capture the interdependence between culture and institutions. 
 
3. The model 
 
still remembered his cheating and did not accept him as a refugee. Shang Yang was thus caught and killed by King 
Hui. 
15 Qin’s emphasis on merit can be seen from the data in He (1996) who presents a table of significant families at that 
time. While Chu has 20, Qi has 33, Qin has only 3 (p. 112). For notable individuals belonging to powerful clans, Chu 
has 122 out of 279, Qi has 137 out of 273, while Qin has 8 out of 58 (p. 114). For the ratio between individuals from 
significant families and others, Chu has a ratio of 122 to 74, Qi has a ratio of 137 to 57, while Qin has a ratio of 8 to 
22 (p. 115). 
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 Time is discrete. Variables carry a subscript 𝑡. However, frequently subscripts may not be 
used if there is no confusion from doing this. The size of the population does not change over time 
and is normalized to one. There are two types of individuals in the population: C-type or L-type. 
An individual following Confucianism is C-type. For C-type individuals, they believe that 
government positions should be inherited. An individual following Legalism is L-type. For L-type 
individuals, they believe that government officials should be chosen by merit. The percentage of 
L-type individuals in period 𝑡 is 𝑠௧. An individual lives for one period. Each individual has only 
one parent and only one child. All individuals are risk neutral. 
The timing of events is as follows. First, given the percentages of distinct types of 
individuals, a ruler at the beginning of a period chooses the percentage of officials selected by 
merit, which is 𝐺. Adoption of Legalist institutions means that a higher percentage of officials is 
chosen by merit. Second, individuals meet and establish projects. The ruler’s choice of 𝐺 affects 
the payoffs of individuals. Third, individuals decide the level of direct socialization of their 
children, which will affect the percentage of types of individuals in the next period. Finally, in the 
next period, a new ruler will choose the percentage of officials chosen by merit. 
First, during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, rulers frequently got 
killed by their subordinates; many states were conquered by others and disappeared. Thus, internal 
rebellions and external threats were significant challenges faced by a ruler. Like Zhou (2012), 
internal rebellions and external threats affect the ruler’s payoff in this model. If the ruler handles 
both successfully, his payoff is a constant normalized to one. Otherwise, his payoff is zero. The 
ruler chooses the percentage of government officials chosen by merit 𝐺 to maximize his expected 
payoff. Thus, 𝐺 ∈ [0,1]. Since adopting Legalist institutions increases military power, we specify 
that an increase in 𝐺 indicates an increase in the military power of the ruler. The level of external 
threats is 𝛺, which is a positive constant. Following the literature on rent-seeking, the ruler handles 
external threats successfully with probability ீீାఆ. 
When the percentage of L-type individuals is 𝑠௧ and the ruler’s choice is 𝐺, the possibility 
that internal rebellions happen is(𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ. The explanation of the possibility is as follows. First, 
if the percentage of officials chosen by merit is the same as the percentage of L-type persons (𝐺 =𝑠௧), the ruler’s choice is consistent with status quo and there is no internal rebellion. Second, if the 
ruler tries to increase the percentage of officials chosen by merit (𝐺 > 𝑠௧), new positions would 
have to be established by eliminating inherited ones. Those whose positions are eliminated may 
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rebel, and the possibility of internal rebellions increases when more inherited positions are 
eliminated. That is, the possibility of internal rebellions increases if the difference between the 
percentage of officials chosen by merit and the percentage of L-type individuals increases. Third, 
internal rebellions also happen if the ruler chooses a percentage of officials by merit lower than 
the percentage of L-type individuals (𝐺 < 𝑠௧) because incapable officials will reduce the payoffs 
of L-type individuals and L-type individuals may rebel. As shown later in Proposition 3, this case 
that the percentage of officials chosen by merit is lower than the percentage of L-type individuals 
will not arise in equilibrium. With this specification of the possibility of internal rebellion, if a 
higher percentage of individuals is L-type, the ruler will have an incentive to choose a higher 
percentage of officials by merit; If a higher percentage of individuals is C-type, the ruler will have 
an incentive to have a higher percentage of officials chosen by inheritance. That is, the state of 
culture in a country determines a ruler’s institutional choice.  
Since the possibility that the ruler survives internal rebellions is 1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ and his 
possibility of handling external threats successfully is ீீାఆ, his expected payoff is ீீାఆ [1 − (𝐺 −𝑠௧)ଶ]. The ruler chooses 𝐺 to maximize his expected payoff, subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ 𝐺 ≤1. For 𝜆ଵ and 𝜆ଶ denoting costate variables, the Lagrange for this maximization problem is 
   ீீାఆ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ] + 𝜆ଵ𝐺 + 𝜆ଶ(1 − 𝐺). 
The following conditions are necessary for the ruler’s maximization: 
   ఆ(ீାఆ)మ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ] − ଶீீାఆ (𝐺 − 𝑠௧) + 𝜆ଵ − 𝜆ଶ = 0,        (1) 
   𝜆ଵ𝐺 = 0, 𝜆ଵ ≥ 0, 0G , 
   𝜆ଶ(1 − 𝐺) = 0, 𝜆ଶ ≥ 0, 1G . 
There are three cases for equation (1). In the first case, in an interior equilibrium the level 
of 𝐺 is neither zero nor one. With 𝜆ଵ = 0 and 𝜆ଶ = 0, equation (1) becomes 
   ఆீାఆ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ] − 2𝐺(𝐺 − 𝑠௧) = 0.          (2) 
In the second case, if 𝜆ଶ > 0, then 𝐺 = 1. Thus, equation (1) becomes 
   ఆீାఆ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ] − 2𝐺(𝐺 − 𝑠௧) > 0.          (3) 
In the third case, if 𝜆ଵ > 0, then 𝐺 = 0. Thus, equation (1) becomes 
   ఆீାఆ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠௧)ଶ] − 2𝐺(𝐺 − 𝑠௧) < 0.          (4) 
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Second, individuals are matched randomly to establish projects in each period. When 
individuals of the same type meet, an individual has a clear expectation and understanding of his 
or her partner, and they do not need the intervention of governmental officials. Thus, their payoffs 
will not be affected by the percentage of officials chosen by merit. Specifically, when a C-type 
individual meets with another C-type one, each gets a payoff of 𝑦 from the project they establish, 
a nonnegative constant. When two L-type individuals meet to establish a project, each gets a payoff 
of 𝑏, a nonnegative constant. When individuals of different types meet to establish a project, they 
will disagree and need to go to government officials for dispute settlements. The possibility that 
an individual gets a favorable result is directly proportional to the percentage of officials with 
similar views. Let 𝑚 and 𝑛 denote positive constants. When an L-type individual meets with a C-
type one, if the L-type individual receives a favorable treatment from an official, the payoff from 
the project is 𝑚; otherwise, the payoff is zero. Since the percentage of officials chosen by merit is 𝐺, when an L-type individual meets with a C-type one, the L-type individual’s expected payoff 
from the project is 𝑚𝐺 . When an L-type individual meets with a C-type one, if the C-type 
individual receives a favorable treatment from an official, the payoff from the project is 𝑛 ; 
otherwise, the payoff is zero. Since the percentage of officials chosen through inheritance is 1 −𝐺, when an L-type individual meets with a C-type one, the C-type person’s expected payoff from 
the project is 𝑛(1 − 𝐺).16  
For an L-type individual, this person meets another L-type one 𝑠௧ percent of the time and 
a C-type one 1 − 𝑠௧ percent of the time. Thus, an L-type individual’s expected payoff is 𝑠௧𝑏 +(1 − 𝑠௧)𝑚𝐺. For a C-type individual, this individual meets an L-type one 𝑠௧ percent of the time 
and another C-type one 1 − 𝑠௧ percent of the time. Thus, a C-type individual’s expected payoff is 𝑠௧𝑛(1 − 𝐺) + (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑦.  
 Third, the evolution of the percentage of L-type individuals is as follows. Following Bisin 
and Verdier (2001), the type of an individual is affected by parent (direct socialization) and social 
 
16 In this model, we specify that an L-type individual’s payoff increases with the percentage of officials chosen by 
merit when an L-type individual meets with a C-type one. This assumption is motivated by the observation that once 
Legalist institutions are adopted, behaviors consistent with this school would be encouraged and rewarded. This 
assumption is not essential. Alternatively, we may assume that the payoff of two L-type individuals meet increases 
with the percentage of officials chosen by merit while the payoffs when an L-type individual meets with a C-type one 
and when two C-type persons meet are not affected by the percentage of officials chosen by merit. Results under this 
alternative assumption will be similar because what is important in this model is that an increase in the adoption of 
Legalist institutions will increase the payoffs of individuals with similar beliefs relatively more. 
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environment (indirect socialization). For 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐿, 𝐶, the probability that a parent of type 𝑖 will have 
an offspring of type 𝑗 is 𝑞௜௝. Between an L-type individual and her offspring, direct socialization 
takes place with probability 𝑑௅ , where the superscript 𝐿  means “Legalism”. For indirect 
socialization which happens with probability 1 − 𝑑௅, the offspring will meet an L-type individual 
with probability 𝑠௧. The possibility that an L-type individual having an L-type offspring is the sum 
of the possibilities of direct socialization and indirect socialization: 𝑞௅௅ = 𝑑௅ + (1 − 𝑑௅)𝑠௧. The 
possibility that an L-type individual having a C-type offspring is through indirect socialization 
only: 𝑞௅஼ = (1 − 𝑑௅)(1 − 𝑠௧). The probability for a C-type parent to have the same type child 
directly is 𝑑஼, where the superscript 𝐶 means “Confucian”. Overall, the transition probabilities 
between types are as follows: 
    𝑞஼஼ = 𝑑஼ + (1 − 𝑑஼)(1 − 𝑠௧),         (5a) 
    𝑞஼௅ = (1 − 𝑑஼)𝑠௧,           (5b) 
    𝑞௅஼ = (1 − 𝑑௅)(1 − 𝑠௧),          (5c) 
    𝑞௅௅ = 𝑑௅ + (1 − 𝑑௅)𝑠௧.          (5d) 
 Plugging the value of 𝑞஼௅ from (5b) and the value of 𝑞௅௅ from (5d) into 𝑠௧ାଵ = 𝑠௧𝑞௅௅ +(1 − 𝑠௧)𝑞஼௅ yields 
    𝑠௧ାଵ − 𝑠௧ = 𝑠௧(1 − 𝑠௧)(𝑑௅ − 𝑑஼).           (6) 
We now study a continuous-time version of the model. From (6), the following equation 
determines the dynamics of the percentage of L-type individuals if time is continuous rather than 
discrete: 
    𝑠௧̇ = 𝑠௧(1 − 𝑠௧)(𝑑௅ − 𝑑஼).            (7) 
 Following Francois and Zabojnik (2005), we specify that 𝑑௅ − 𝑑஼ is an increasing function 
of the difference of payoffs to different types of individuals. This function is 𝛷 and 𝛷ᇱ > 0. We 
also specify that 𝛷(0) = 0. Since the expected payoff difference between an L-type individual 
and a C-type one is 𝑠௧𝑏 + (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑚𝐺 − 𝑠௧𝑛(1 − 𝐺) − (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑦, equation (7) yields 
  𝑠௧̇ = 𝑠௧(1 − 𝑠௧)𝛷[𝑠௧𝑏 + (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑚𝐺 − 𝑠௧𝑛(1 − 𝐺) − (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑦].         (8) 
 For the dynamics of the percentage of L-type individuals, we have 
  𝑠௧̇ = ൝> 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠௧𝑏 + (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑚𝐺 − 𝑠௧𝑛(1 − 𝐺) − (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑦 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠௧ < 1; < 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠௧𝑏 + (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑚𝐺 − 𝑠௧𝑛(1 − 𝐺) − (1 − 𝑠௧)𝑦 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠௧ > 0;= 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.  
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In a steady state, the percentage of individuals does not change over time. We remove 
subscripts for variables in a steady state. 
 
 Definition: A steady state is stable if there exists a 𝜀̅  such that for all 𝜀 ∈ [0, 𝜀]̅ , ?̇?(𝐺∗(𝑠∗ − 𝜀), 𝑠∗ − 𝜀) > 0 and ?̇?(𝐺∗(𝑠∗ + 𝜀), 𝑠∗ + 𝜀) < 0. 
 
 The following proposition shows that a corner steady state in which all individuals are L-
type always exists. 
 
 Proposition 1: The steady state 𝑠 = 1 and 𝐺 = 1 is stable if 
     𝑏 > 0.              (9) 
 Proof: When 𝑠 = 1 and 𝐺 = 1, (1) becomes ఆଵାఆ ≥ 0. This inequality is always satisfied. 
Thus, there is no tendency for 𝐺 to decrease. When (9) is satisfied, there is no tendency for 𝑠 to 
decrease. ■ 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When all individuals are L-type and all 
officials are chosen by merit, the payoff of an individual of L-type is 𝑏, a positive number. If a 
child switches to a C-type, the payoff of a C-type paired with an L-type is zero. Since (9) is 
satisfied, it is more profitable to stay as an L-type rather than to become a C-type. Since it is not 
profitable for anyone to switch to C-type, the equilibrium that all individuals are L-type is always 
stable. 
 The following proposition establishes a condition for a corner steady state in which all 
individuals are C-type to be stable. 
 
 Proposition 2: The steady state 𝑠 = 0 and 𝐺 = 𝐺∗ defined by equation (11) below is stable 
if  𝐺∗ < ௬௠.             (10) 
This equilibrium is less likely to be stable when external threats increase. 
Proof: From (8), for the steady state to be stable, we need (10) to be satisfied. 
For 𝑠 = 0, equation (2) simplifies to 
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𝛺 − 2𝐺ଷ − 3𝛺𝐺ଶ = 0.          (11) 
For equation (11), an application of implicit function theorems shows that 𝐺  is an 
increasing function of 𝛺. That is, when external threats increase, (10) is less likely to be valid. ■ 
 
The interpretation of (10) is as follows. Equation (11) defines 𝐺∗ = 𝐺∗(𝛺) and ௗீ∗ௗఆ > 0. 
Inequality (10) indicates that if external threats is lower than a critical level determined by 𝑦/𝑚, a 
steady state with everyone is of the Confucian type is stable. That is, a Confucian steady state is 
possible only if external threats are low. Proposition 2 is consistent with the observation of the 
Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods that an increase in external threats increases 
the incentive for a ruler to reform. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: When all 
individuals are C-type, an individual’s payoff is 𝑦. If a child switches to L-type, this individual 
will get an expected payoff of 𝑚𝐺. If (10) is valid, it does not pay for a child to switch and the 
equilibrium that all individuals are C-type is stable. 
A point (𝑠∗, 𝐺∗) is an interior steady state if ?̇?(𝑠∗, 𝐺∗) = 0 and (2) is valid. In an interior 
steady state in which (2) holds with equality, an application of implicit function theorem shows 
that the result that a higher level of external threats will increase the ruler’s incentive to adopt 
Legalist institutions is also valid in this case.  
The following proposition shows that the percentage of officials chosen by merit is lower 
than the percentage of individuals of Legalist type will not arise in equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3: In an interior steady state, the percentage of Legalist institutions is higher 
than the percentage of L-type individuals: 𝐺 > 𝑠.  
Proof: In an interior solution, ఆீାఆ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠)ଶ] > 0. From (2), we have 𝐺 − 𝑠 > 0. ■ 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. The marginal benefit of increasing the 
percentage of officials chosen by merit is ఆ(ீାఆ)మ [1 − (𝐺 − 𝑠)ଶ] and the marginal cost is ଶீீାఆ (𝐺 −𝑠) . When the percentage of officials chosen by merit is equal to the percentage of L-type 
individuals, the marginal benefit is strictly positive while the marginal cost is zero. Thus, it pays 
to have the percentage of officials chosen by merit higher than the percentage of L-type 
individuals. 
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We now study the existence, uniqueness, and stability of interior steady states. Equation 
(2) has two roots: 𝐺 − 𝑠 = −ට1 + ீమ(ீାఆ)మఆమ ± ீ(ଵାఆ)ఆ .   
For the two roots, the root 𝐺 − 𝑠 = −ට1 + ீమ(ீାఆ)మఆమ − ீ(ଵାఆ)ఆ  is discarded because it 
violates 𝐺 > 𝑠. The other root is kept. This root yields the following relationship between 𝐺 and 𝑠: 
   𝛹ଵ ≡ 𝑠 + ට1 + ீమ(ீାఆ)మఆమ − 𝐺 − ீ(ଵାఆ)ఆ = 0.        (12) 
In equation (12), 𝐺 increases with 𝑠.  
In a steady state, the percentage of L-type individuals is constant. When the percentage of 
L-type individuals is neither zero nor one, from (8), the expected payoffs of the two types of 
individuals should be equal in a steady state: 
    𝛹ଶ ≡ 𝑠𝑏 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑚𝐺 − 𝑠𝑛(1 − 𝐺) − (1 − 𝑠)𝑦 = 0.      (13) 
In an interior steady state, equations (12) and (13) form a system of two equations defining 
two endogenous variables 𝐺 and 𝑠 as functions of exogenous parameters. From (13), we have 𝐺 = ௦௡ା(ଵି௦)௬ି௦௕௦௡ା(ଵି௦)௠ .          (14) 
Partial differentiation of this expression yields డீడ௦ = ௠௡ି௕௠ି௡௬[௦௡ା(ଵି௦)௠]మ. Depending on whether 𝑚𝑛 −𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 is negative or positive, there are two cases.  
First, if 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 < 0, equation (13) shows a negative relationship between 𝐺 and 𝑠, and the two curves 𝛹ଵ and 𝛹ଶ may intersect at most once. If ௬ି௠௕ା௬ି௠ > 1 + ଵାఆఆ − ට1 + (ଵାఆ)మఆమ , 𝛹ଶ is always above 𝛹ଵ and the two curves will not intersect, and no interior steady state exists. 
The case that the two curves intersect once is shown in Figure 1. When 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 < 0, the 
interior steady state is unstable. Thus, the equilibrium shown in Figure 1 is unstable. In Figures 1 
and 2, the dashed curve is 𝛹ଵ and the dotted curve is 𝛹ଶ. Dynamics of the percentage of Legalist 
type persons over time is indicated via arrows. The economy always moves along the 𝛹ଵ curve, as 
indicated by the movement of the symbol ⊳. The steady-states are indicated by circles. The filled 
circles are stable, and the hollow ones are unstable. 
 
20 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Second, if 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 > 0, 𝐺  increases with 𝑠 . In this case, both 𝛹ଵ  and 𝛹ଶ  have 
positive slopes, they may not intersect, intersect once, or intersect multiple times. The case that 
the two curves intersect twice is shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, for 𝛹ଶ, when 𝐺 = 1, 𝑠 = 1 from 
equation (13) because 𝑚 > 𝑦 is necessary for 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 > 0. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Since the sign of 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 is crucial in affecting the characteristics of the steady 
state, it is valuable to interpret the economics behind it. How to interpret 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 < 0? 
Partial differentiation of equation (13) yields 
   డீడ௦ = − ങ೻మങೞങ೻మങಸ = ି[௕ା௬ି௠ீି௡(ଵିீ)]௦௡ା(ଵି௦)௠ .          (15) 
From (15), since 𝑠𝑛 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑚 > 0, డீడ௦ < 0 if and only if  𝑏 + 𝑦 > 𝑚𝐺 + 𝑛(1 − 𝐺).          (16) 
Inequality (16) can be interpreted as follows. Remember that 𝑏 is the payoff to a Legalist 
when two Legalists meet and 𝑦 is the payoff to a Confucian if two Confucian type persons meet. 
Also, when a Confucian meets with a Legalist, a Confucian gets 𝑛 with probability 1 − 𝐺 and a 
Legalist gets 𝑚 with probability 𝐺. When inequality (16) is satisfied, it says that the total payoffs 
when the same type of persons meet is higher than the total expected payoffs when different types 
of persons meet. It is understandable that when inequality (16) is valid, it is more likely that 
individuals will be the same type in a steady state because total surplus is higher when individuals 
are of the same type than that when individuals belong to mixed types. That is, stable corner 
solution will be more likely when inequality (16) holds. In (16), 𝐺 is endogenously determined. 
Plugging the value of 𝐺 from (14) into (16) yields 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑏𝑚 − 𝑛𝑦 < 0.  
From Propositions 1 and 2, if 𝐺∗ < 𝑦/𝑚, two stable corner steady states exist. Also, stable 
interior steady states may exist. The existence of multiple stable steady states can be used to 
explain why the state of Qin was the eventual unifier of China while other states did not engage in 
reforms as comprehensively as Qin did. With a culture different from those of other states, Qin 
adopted Legalist institutions comprehensively. The adoption of Legalist institutions again 
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increased the percentage of L-type individuals in Qin, and Qin ended up in a steady state with a 
high percentage of L-type individuals. While adopting Legalist institutions could increase military 
power, rulers in other states with a high percentage of C-type individuals did not adopt them for 
fear of internal rebellions, and those states ended up in another steady state. With a higher 
percentage of Legalist institutions, Qin’s military capacity was higher than other states’ and the 
state of Qin eventually conquered other states and unified China. 
 
4. Other examples of interdependence between culture and institutions affecting long-run 
performance 
 In this section, we provide two additional examples to illustrate the interdependence of 
culture and institutions on long-run performance.  
First, China was divided in the period of Southern and Northern dynasties. Even though 
regime changes were frequent in this period and various exogenous shocks affected performance, 
the interdependence between culture and institutions is still useful to illustrate different 
performance between the north and the south. In the north, land was occupied by various nomadic 
groups that established political regimes. Thus, the north was a mixture of Han (汉) and nomadic 
groups. For the influence of culture on institutions, since clans were not so powerful culturally and 
politically, Northern Wei developed the equal-field system under which lands were distributed to 
peasants. For the influence of institutions on culture, with the equal-field system the power of clans 
was contained, therefore Han (汉) nobles in the north needed performance to survive and they 
developed a practical culture with skills in military and government (Tang, 1992). In the south, to 
avoid wars, large numbers of Han (汉) Chinese had emigrated from the north. While borders 
between the north and the south shifted frequently over the years, roughly speaking the south was 
not occupied by nomadic groups. For the influence of culture on institutions, with the strong 
cultural and military power of clans in the south, emperors needed the support of clans to rule. 
Clans occupied mountains and rivers and it would be impractical for rulers in the south to adopt 
the equal-field system. For the influence of institutions on culture, even though rulers in the south 
such as Liu Yu (刘裕) tried to promote officials from insignificant family backgrounds, overall 
politics in the south was still controlled by powerful clans. With family backgrounds playing an 
essential role in selecting officials, the south developed a culture called Neo-Daoism (玄学). Under 
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this, Han (汉) nobles engaged in “empty chat” (清谈) of classics and philosophy.17 This kind of 
behavior can be understood in terms of signaling. The classics were difficult to understand and 
normally familial instruction over generations was needed for proficiency. Difficult to mimic, 
individuals from powerful clans used empty chat to demonstrate their cultural superiority. A cost 
of engaging in empty chat is that nobles in the south lacked military and political skills. This kind 
of signaling is like male peacocks carrying beautiful and long tails: it is useful to show a peacock 
is strong but carrying a long tail makes this peacock more likely to be predated by other animals. 
In the south, powerful clans hid population from the government and government tax revenues 
were reduced. In the north, the equal-field system helped the collection of taxes for the 
government. Eventually, the north under Sui succeeded in unifying China. 
Second, Iran provides another example of the interdependence between culture and 
institutions.18 This interdependence in Iran during the second half of the 20th century can be shown 
as follows. Historically, religious groups in Iran developed their own financial resources and 
legitimacy independent from secular governments (Daniel, 2000, chap. 4). While land reform 
helped economic growth in countries such as South Korea, it was difficult to implement in Iran. 
For the influence of culture on institutions, land reform under King Pahlavi was opposed by 
religious leaders because of “the incompatibility of such legislation with Islamic principle” (Milani, 
1994, p. 45). This reduced the legitimacy of institutional changes. Institutional reforms adopted by 
King Pahlavi in Iran contributed to rebellions of religious leaders. While King Pahlavi’s policy 
mistakes and the human rights orientation of the Carter Administration in the United States were 
important in explaining the downfall of King Pahlavi in 1979; religious groups provided the 
organizational networks and financial resources in the rebellion against the Shah. For the influence 
of institutions on culture after the revolution, “a body of new Islamic laws became the foundation 
of the new legal system” (Milani, 1994, p. 200), and institutions adopted in Iran reinforced Islamic 
culture. Hundreds of political opponents were either killed or exiled (Daniel, 2000, chap. 8). Living 
standards for average citizens in Iran in the 1980s were worse than those in the 1970s. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
17 This originated from the evaluation of officials in the Han dynasty. 
18 Kuran (2004) provides an illustration of how economic development in the Middle East is affected by institutions 
established long time ago. 
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 Many scholars believe that institutions are important in determining an economy’s long-
run performance. Then, why don’t developing countries adopt institutions in developed countries 
to become rich? Culture affects power distribution in a country and the ability of the government 
to adopt institutions successfully. While institutional reforms could make a country rich, 
institutions may not be adopted because they could also increase political turmoil. 
In this paper, we have used the interdependence of culture and institutions to explain long-
run performance. In this model, culture affects a ruler’s choice of institutions, while culture itself 
evolves endogenously over time. The model is illustrated using cases from Chinese history. For 
example, the conflicts between the state of Qin and other states were both military and cultural. 
Qin did not strictly practice the patriarchal clan system advocated by Confucianism, thus the power 
of elites in Qin was smaller than that in other states. With a culture different from other states, Qin 
adopted Legalist institutions and government officials were selected by merit; and Qin ended up 
in a steady state with a large percentage of individuals oriented toward material incentives. 
Institutions introduced through the Reforms of Shang Yang further changed Qin’s culture. Even 
though adopting Legalist institutions could increase military power, rulers in other states did not 
adopt them comprehensively for fear of internal rebellions. Other states ended up in another steady 
state with a large percentage of individuals valuing loyalty and family values. Interdependence 
between culture and institutions in Iran is also discussed. 
 There are some interesting generalizations and extensions of the model. First, the model 
may be extended to a more general production structure for different types of individuals. Second, 
while this paper focuses on the interaction between culture and institutions to explain Qin’s 
unification of China, there are other interesting mechanisms. A referee suggests the following 
mechanism based on difference in population density. States differ in their population densities 
with the state of Qin had a lower population density than other states. Aristocrats or county 
magistrates choose how much tax revenue to forward to the center and that their future incomes 
are decided by their future decisions. A lower population density made it more difficult for Qin 
aristocrats to oppose the rule of the central government. This made it easier for Qin rulers to adopt 
Legalist institutions.  
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Figure 1: Existence of a steady state, 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑚𝑏 − 𝑛𝑦 < 0 
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Figure 2: Existence of a steady state, 𝑚𝑛 − 𝑚𝑏 − 𝑛𝑦 > 0 
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